Markets for safety : product recalls yield mixed effects on firms by Betty Joyce Nash
F
or customers, product defects
can create inconvenience at
best and cause injury or death
at worst. Ensuing recalls also can
wreak reputational and sales havoc
on firms and sometimes even com-
petitors as the market accounts for
information about faulty products.
Potential fallout has escalated as the
supply chain has gone global and extended the
product-recall reach. 
A high-profile example involved the 2007
recall of 276 types of toys and other children’s
products, mostly due to lead-based paint.
Parts had been supplied by a multitude of
Chinese manufacturers, and toys were sold
under brand names in the United States. In
another case, a 33-year-old family-run Virginia
firm sought bankruptcy after salmonella, traced to
peanuts used in foods worldwide, was linked to
sickness and several deaths.
Firms can and do survive product
recalls, but the direct costs of severe
recalls can be high. Indirect costs may
in some cases exceed direct costs. Less
severe recalls may cost very little. Firms
may suffer regulatory fines, as in the
case of Toyota’s recent $16.4 million levied
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), but are most likely punished by the market in
a severe recall. Firms may suffer market share and stock
value declines after demand plunges. Margins can shrink
if a manufacturer slashes prices to spur sales. For
instance, Toyota drove April automobile sales by flooding
the market with buyer incentives, a sign of fear about 
the extent of a recall’s damage to its bottom line and 
reputation, says automotive economist George Hoffer 
of Virginia Commonwealth University. Recalls can tarnish
reputations.
Market response is important, and economists have
tried to make sense of how direct and indirect 
costs add up after a recall. It’s complicated 
to unravel the array of factors at play but market
responses do generally provide incentives for firms
to make safe products. These days, markets can
respond more quickly than ever to product recalls,
though long-term effects appear mixed in empirical studies. 
Reputation on the Line
Research has confirmed the benefit of a good reputation in
the marketplace. Using the definition of reputation to mean
the “consumer’s subjective evaluation of the perceived 
quality” of the producer, management professors Pamela
Haunschild of the University of Texas-Austin and Mooweon
Rhee of the University of Hawaii studied how the reputa-
tion of an automaker affects market share in response to
recalls. 
High-reputation firms enjoy lower costs, can charge
higher prices, and can access capital more easily. They profit
from better sales and status, and that serves as some protec-
tion against competitors and new market entrants. These
assets also translate into greater survival rates and better
financial performance. “A positive reputation is also impor-
tant to a firm’s competitive advantage because it is a positive
signal to potential buyers and suppliers, increasing their 
willingness to contract with a firm,” the authors write. 
A good reputation naturally creates expectations of 
quality among consumers. The market differentiates
between high-quality, high-priced products and low-quality,
low-priced products, with buyers expecting less from
mediocre products. That means missteps in quality among
high-reputation firms violate consumer expectations to a
greater degree and could prompt some brand switching. 
Haunschild and Rhee used official product recall infor-
mation from NHTSA. (While nearly all recalls are
“voluntary,” the law requires that manufacturers conform to
standards. When they find defects, they’re obliged to inform
NHTSA within five days and notify customers.) To explore
how pre-recall reputation influences impacts on recalls, the
authors used auto industry data from 1975 to 1999, and the
results were published in 2006. “The results were pretty
clear,” Haunschild says. “High-reputation firms suffer more
than low-reputation firms.” The authors also investigated
substitution effects and found that among more unique
products, recall impacts were lessened because “consumers
can’t just go find another alternative.”
With the instantaneous information flow via the
Internet, reputation effects could be greater. “For the high-
reputation automakers, my sense is, and we see it with
Toyota, there is more of a penalty," she says. Studies indicate
consumers may refresh expectations after learning of
defects and that may prompt substitute purchases. 
Haunschild and Rhee also investigated the possibility
that high-reputation firms suffer stiffer market penalty


























BY BETTY JOYCE NASH
16 Region Focus | Second Quarter | 2010 
Product recalls yield mixed effects on firms
 counted news articles at the time of recalls of the highest-
reputation firm and the lowest — at the time those were
Lexus and Hyundai, respectively. Again, results were unam-
biguous. “When Lexus had a recall, there were many more
articles about it than when Hyundai did,” Haunschild says.
Recalls get more publicity when firms are well-known for
quality and when the recall affects many people.
Effects on Demand for Cars, Toys, Food
Product recalls can slow sales, and sometimes consumers are
even reluctant to buy from rival firms producing products
within the same category. Automotive recalls date to 1966
and the birth of NHTSA in the wake of the success of 
consumer advocate Ralph Nader’s 1965 book, Unsafe at Any
Speed. That first year, manufacturers issued 58 recalls, affect-
ing 982,823 vehicles. Recalled vehicle numbers have varied
over the past decade, but the general trend indicates num-
bers are rising. In 2008, NHTSA announced 22.5 million
vehicles in 781 recalls, but in 2009 the numbers fell to 570
recalls, affecting 17.8 million vehicles. 
In years past, unbiased information about product 
quality was generally unavailable, certainly compared to the
plethora of independent sources available today. Back then,
consumers may have used recalls as a proxy for quality,
according to economists Hoffer and his co-authors, Steven
Crafton, formerly of George Mason University, and Robert
Reilly of Virginia Commonwealth University. In a 1981 paper,
they researched effects on demand for specific car models
recalled, on models of the same make, and on the demand
for similar models made by competitors (substitutes). The
authors categorized recalls by severity, using data from
NHTSA. 
“What we found was that the market responded to a
severe recall in the month after the recall,” Hoffer says. 
“It did not respond to more minor recalls.” While a severe
recall affected demand of the model recalled, it did not
affect other lines within the same car make. In particular,
the Ford Pinto recall was found to affect not only Pinto 
but competitors’ similar models. Consumers apparently
inferred problems with similar-size models, regardless of the 
company of manufacture, according to the authors.
Another way the market can penalize firms is through
equity response. Findings on shareholder wealth effects are
mixed, however. Early work by economists Gregg Jarrell,
currently of the University of Rochester, and Sam Peltzman
of the University of Chicago in 1985 found effects greater
than the direct costs of an automotive recall. Hoffer and his
co-authors found no significant effects on auto firms’ share-
holders or on recalled firms’ competitors.
More recent studies find that the stock market responds
quickly to certain product defects, especially severe ones.
For example, a recall on defective heaters cost shareholders
less than an airbag recall. Economist Nicholas Rupp of East
Carolina University found certain types of recalls caused 
significant shareholder loss, exceeding direct costs. “One of
the conclusions I draw is that effects are limited unless
they’re persistent and serious recalls, sometimes resulting in
injury or death or in cases where the media piles on,” he says.
Rupp measured the dollar value shareholders lost under 
certain recall characteristics, in order to identify attributes
that cause significant losses. Particularly costly, he notes, are
recalls of new makes and models “where consumers don’t
have much information and then suddenly they get this
news.” Minor recalls of heaters, defrosters, or air-condition-
ing units were not costly whereas airbag recalls were. Airbag
recalls, in 1983 dollars, cost between $136 million and 
$162 million in equity losses, he estimated. Highly rated
companies — those with AAAbond ratings — had the most
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Before consumers became more sensitive to product safety,
the knowledge gap between the buying public and product
makers loomed large. That’s when Underwriters Laboratory
(UL) got started. ULtoday dominates the independent test-
ing market, with 64 labs, testing, and certification facilities
that serve customers in 98 countries. Founded in 1894 by 
an electrical engineer, UL first catered to insurance firms
wanting to gauge fire risks associated with new electric
appliances. ULdeveloped testing for the hazards, and from
there, the product list grew. 
Today, 20 billion UL-approved labels go on 72,000 man-
ufacturers’ products annually. Getting UL certification is
voluntary, for the most part, and procedures and standards
remain unregulated. In some cases, government testing
standards may apply, and UL also has played a large role in
promulgating some of the standards. 
In the 1970s, Underwriters Laboratory investigated
10,000 incidents of television fires, and developed federal
television standards adopted and still used by the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). UL con-
ducts quarterly product tests at factories to monitor quality,
and companies pay for the tests and the use of the ULlabel,
now a standard symbol of quality in the marketplace. 
As recall numbers have grown, so has this private market
for raters and certifiers. Such groups range from published
“lists” to private labs like UL. Many are authorized to
inform and certify products for government agencies such
as the CPSC and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). 
In other fields, bond agencies rate issuers, health-care
raters grade hospitals, Consumer Reports magazine and J.D.
Power and Associates rate products and services.  
In 1988 OSHA established a list of recognized private
laboratories to certify and test the products that must 
conform to the agency’s standards. Today, 15 private labs are
recognized on OSHA’s roster.   — BETTY JOYCE NASH
The Private Component of Product Safety Testing 
 to lose from a recall announcement.
Economists Suresh Govindaraj and Bikki Jaggi of Rutgers
evaluated in 2004 the market reaction in a specific case, the
recall of the brand of tires linked to Ford Explorer rollovers.
Market losses again exceeded direct costs for this firm. The
authors also found that tire competitors gained market
value, “probably because their products were substitutes for
the products affected by recall.”
Another study documents how consumer perceptions
produce these spillover effects to other products. The 2007
toy recall that covered items containing lead paint 
represented an 80 percent increase in the number of recalled
kids’ toys over a two-year period. Economists found indus-
try-wide effects. Even infant/preschool toy manufacturers
without recalled products suffered a 25 percent decline in
sales. Overall holiday sales for similar products by manufac-
turers named in the recalls fell by about 30 percent,
compared to other products sold by the same makers. 
Efforts to observe how people make decisions and 
inferences can prove useful to policymakers, according to
one of the paper’s co-authors, economist Seth Freedman, a
doctoral candidate at the University of Maryland. After the
toy recalls, Consumer Product Safety Commission laws were
strengthened. “If consumers punish the manufacturer
enough, then the manufacturer will have incentive to 
produce safe toys,” he says. “But if consumers can’t direct
the punishment to a specific target, then the manufacturer
may have incentive to produce at lower quality.” He was
referring to the multiple suppliers of toy parts to a wide
range of companies. Since people didn’t know exactly which
toys were made by suppliers using lead paint, purchases of
toys that were in the recalled category declined generally. 
Uncertainties about market response remain. For exam-
ple, toy sales among nonrecalled categories didn’t suffer,
even of those firms that were hit by the recall. But Freedman
points out that it’s unknown whether consumer preference
or the increased advertising and promotion by the company
facing recalls were responsible. Freedman and his co-authors
also found capital market losses at the time of the recalls but
could not associate the losses with particular recalls. 
Recent research has investigated spillover effects in the
pharmaceutical industry. John Cawley of Cornell University
and John Rizzo of Stony Brook University published a
National Bureau of Economic Research working paper in
2005 using the withdrawal of a drug combination (fen-phen)
from the market. The drug was withdrawn in 1997 for poten-
tially fatal side effects. The paper found that competitor
drugs benefited from that withdrawal.
Food recalls may represent the greatest threat for firms
caught in the growing web of the supply chain when things
go wrong. Those can be especially dangerous and costly, 
and may explain why food companies account for 75 percent
to 90 percent of product recall insurance coverage, intro-
duced in the late 1980s after Tylenol tampering. Demand for
such insurance has been growing at a rate of about 30 per-
cent a year. While most food companies don’t have product
recall insurance because it’s expensive, demand is growing,
according to insurers who offer these types of policies. The
insurance can cover direct and indirect losses.
While the cost of auto and drug recalls have been inves-
tigated, there’s less research about product recalls of food
despite recent illness outbreaks involving hamburgers, fruit
juices, prepared meats, fruits, and vegetables. Agricultural
economists Victoria Salin of Texas A&M University and
Neal Hooker of Ohio State University investigated stock
market reaction to four food recall events of microbiological
contamination. Results varied by product, company size,
scope, and severity. Returns to shareholders in some cases
fell, but stock market reaction could not be detected in
other incidents.
The empirical evidence that detects effects on firms in
the case of recalls is hard to arrange and decipher, given the
wide range of products, severity, timing, and reputation 
of firms. While less-severe recalls may be nonevents for
firms, one certainty stands out: In the case of a major defect
that causes illness or death, even a reputable firm will be
penalized not only by regulators but also by the hand of the
market.
“The market is efficient at meting out justice,” Rupp says.
“The market will punish and reward accordingly.”  RF
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